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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 17 July 1957

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	R. Amory, Jr	. STATOTHE	s on A		
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- from Washington and requested a STATOTHR 1. Zabar called luncheon appointment, to which Schwartz agreed. Zabar began by stating that he considered his personal contact with the STATOTHR United States Government because he no longer has any direct contact with the Department, using messengers or the mails rather than personal visits to conduct his business.
- 2. Zabar indicated that he was "dreadfully worried" about the special U.N. session on Hungary and had discussed the same with Zaroubin. The latter assured him, he said, that the USSR regarded the Hungarian case in the U.N. as an attack on the Soviet Union rather than on Hungary, which constituted a deliberate effort to increase tensions and would make it impossible for "a longer period of time" to achieve settlements of major issues, in response to my question, including disarmament. STATOTHR indicated that he felt there was a distinct threat that disarmament talks in London would be directly affected by the handling of the Hungarian matter in the U.N.

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SUBJECT: Conversation with Charge D'Affaires
Zabar, STATOTHR

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Zabar, 1957

STATOTHR 3. "thinking aloud," explored with Zabar the possibility of doing something "dramatic" in Hungary before September to take the heat off. He suggested, for example, bringing Bela Kovaks into the government as Deputy Prime Minister, to which Zabar said, "maybe as a Minister, but not as Deputy Prime Minister." | STATOTHR then suggested amnesties and invitations to return to Anna Kethly and General Kiraly, to which the response was, "No, no." Finally STATOTHR suggested a general amnesty and commutation of death sentences, which drew a response from Zabar, "We've only killed 50, whereas the French have killed 40,000 in Algeria. Why pick on us in this account?" Zabar volunteered that the only reason Kadar remains as Prime Minister is that it is impossible for him to quit under the fire of U. S. persecution, i.e., a question of face. He went on to say that he recognized the United States Government's strong disapproval of Kadar, but did it not also disapprove of French policies in Algeria without publicly lambasting the French? Why could we not equate the drew the conclusion that the powers that be in Moscow STATOTHRtwo? | would gladly dispose of Kadar if they could do it without loss of face.

- 4. In discussing the recent events in Moscow, Zabar characterized them as a personal struggle for power. He said that in the first days after publication of his victory, Krushchev felt he had to make "a big stink" blackening the ousted members as much as possible and charging them with horrible acts, e.g., Leningrad affair, but after a few days Krushchev saw that this was not necessary.
- 5. Zabar attacked Tito bitterly, claiming that he was <u>internally</u> a complete Stalinist who fooled the West in order to obtain material aid.
- 6. Finally, he said he had been very hurt by the non-attendance at Hungarian National Day and was disturbed by the implication of the reassignment of Mr. Wailes.

STATOTHRY. stated he counted on my disseminating the foregoing to the appropriate officials in the United States Government, and would be happy to try to amplify his report if anyone in State or CIA cared to call him.

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R. AMORY JR